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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Is the decision of the Court of Appeals—that a

prosecutor's opening statement comments which informed jurors of
critical identification testimony previously suppressed by the trial
court constituted harmless error—an erroneous ruling and in
conflict with decisions from this Court in that the Court of
Appeals' decision (A) failed to distinguish opening statement
misconduct from closing argument miscondcut, (B) failed to
adequately address the prosecutor's violation of the trial court's
order, and (C) failed to apply the correct legal standard to the
circumstances of this case?

iv

TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Amendment XIV to the Constitution of the United States provides in
pertinent part:
. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Article I, § 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.
Article I, § 12 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person and
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in which
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance
shall any accused person, before final judgment,
be compelled to advance money or fees to secure
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall
not be compelled to give evidence against himself;
a wife shall not be compelled to testify against
her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense.

v

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ANDREW R. QUINTANA,
Petitioner/Appellant,
v.
Case No.
Priority No. 13

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Appellee.
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.

Case No. 880406-CA
Priority No. 2

ANDREW R. QUINTANA,
Defendant/Appellant.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in State v. Quintana,
No. 880406-CA (filed October 4, 1989) is attached as Addendum A to
this Petition.

A copy of that Court's order denying the

Appellant's timely Petition for Rehearing is attached hereto as
Addendum B.

JURISDICTION
Following the Court of Appeals' decision of October 4,
1989 affirming Mr. Quintana's conviction, a Petition for Rehearing
was timely filed with the Court of Appeals. Pursuant to Rule 45(c)

of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, the filing of that Petition
tolled the time for filing the Petition for Writ of Certiorari until
thirty days following the denial of that Petition for Rehearing.
The Court of Appeals denied the Petition for Rehearing on
November 13, 1989. This Petition for Writ of Certiorari therefore
is timely filed in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of the Utah
Supreme Court.

Jurisdiction is bestowed on this Court pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(5) (Supp. 1989).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Appellant, Andrew R. Quintana, appealed from a judgment
and conviction for Burglary, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202 (1953 as amended), and Theft, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (L953 as
amended), following a jury trial held May 24-25, 1988, in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge, presiding.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions of
Mr. Quintana in a not-for-publication opinion on October 4, 1989. A
copy of that opinion is attached at Addendum A.

In that opinion,

the court held that despite the trial court having granted a
pretrial suppression motion to preclude the prosecutor from using
the eyewitness identification of Mr. Rains, the prosecutor's opening
statement pronouncement that Mr. Rains saw the Defendant, in direct
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contravention of the pretrial suppression order, was harmless error
under the circumstances of this case.
In making that ruling, the Court of Appeals failed to
distinguish opening statement misconduct from closing argument
misconduct as urged by Mr. Quintana, failed to directly address the
prosecutor's violation of the trial court's order as urged by
Mr. Quintana, and failed to apply the correct legal standard urged
by Mr. Quintana to the facts of the case.
for rehearing on each of these points.

Mr. Quintana petitioned

However, that petition was

denied without comment by the Court of Appeals.
Mr. Quintana seeks review of the decision on each of
these questions noting that the Court of Appeals' decision is in
conflict with several cited opinions from this Court and involves
important questions of state and federal law which should be settled
by this Court.

B.

Rule 43, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court (1987).

PERTINENT FACTS

On September 25, 1987, at approximately 9:00 a.m., the
Ted John family left their home at 1162 Emery Avenue, Salt Lake
County, for a two-day trip to southern Utah (R. 118 at 27, 39).
When they returned home the evening of September 27, 1987, the John
family found a note on their door from the police indicating their
home had been burglarized; they were requested to contact the police
(R. 118 at 29). The Johns complained that stereo equipment
including patch cords and a canister vacuum cleaner were missing
(R. 118 at 31). The three-piece stereo unit consisted of an
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aggregate bulk of at least 14x15x10 inches and an aggregate weight
of 16-21 pounds (R. 118 at 31-32, 43-44).

The vacuum cleaner was

described as 3-4 feet high and 14-18 inches across (R. 118 at 31).
Value of the missing items totalled $900 (R. 118 at 31).
On Sunday morning, September 27, 1987, a neighbor across
the street from the John residence observed a burgandy Mazda pickup
truck parked on the street and an individual standing on the porch
of the John home (R. 118 at 57-59).

This woman, Patricia Rains,

watched the individual for approximately five minutes; she observed
him knock on the door, look in the mail box, and peer into the large
picture window of the home (R. 118 at 59-60).

She believed this

person was stranded (R. 118 at 68). She noted that after standing
on the porch for several minutes, the individual returned to the
Mazda pickup truck and drove away.
Patricia Rains1 husband, Calvin Dean Rains, also observed
the person on the porch; he felt the person looked "suspicious"
(R. 118 at 87). A couple of minutes after the person had left in
the Mazda truck, Mr. Rains left in his own truck to go to the
grocery store (R. 118 at 89-90).

As Mr. Rains turned the corner of

his block, he spotted the burgandy pickup parked directly across
from an alley way which ran behind the John residence (R. 118 at
91).

Mr. Rains could not see the person but decided to stop and

observe, and, within a few moments, he saw a person come out of the
alley way (R. 118 at 92-93).
Mr. Rains was 75-80 yards away from the individual but
believed him to be the man that was earlier on the Johns1 porch
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(R. 118 at 93). Mr. Rains believed the man was carrying something
under his shirt; he noted a large bulge on his left-hand side and
that the person was carrying his arm underneath it (R. 118 at 94).
Mr. Rains returned home, spoke with his wife, and she called the
police (R. 118 at 95-96).
Police officer Chris Ahearn responded to the call just
before noon and took descriptions of the suspect and the vehicle
from Mr. and Mrs. Rains (R. 118 at 46-47).

The description given

was a male Hispanic, dark hair, five feet seven inches tall,
approximately 130 pounds (R. 118 at 47). The vehicle was reported
as a Mazda pickup truck, maroon in color with a damaged grill and a
license number of 5600AK (R. 118 at 47, 50). Officer Ahearn
verified the appearance of a burglary and that someone had walked
through the weeds in the alley way behind the John residence (R. 118
at 47-49).
Officer Ahearn prepared a report of his investigation;
that report did not include the name of a suspect (R. 118 at 47).
At approximately 3:00 p.m. that same day, Officer Robert Robinson
spotted a 1983 maroon Mazda pickup truck with license number 3600AK
and pulled it over as the suspect vehicle in the burglary (R. 119 at
4).

Officer Robinson indicated that the dispatch included a

description of a short male Hispanic, in his twenties, short black
hair, wearing a tee shirt and shorts, but no name (R. 119 at 5, 13).
The driver of the vehicle pulled over by Officer Robinson
was Andrew R. Quintana (R. 119 at 5 ) . Mr. Quintana is five foot
three and one-half inches, is a male Hispanic in his twenties, and
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on this day was wearing corduroy shorts (R. 119 at 9, 49); yet,
Officer Robinson did not arrest Mr. Quintana (R. 119 at 16). He
allowed Mr. Quintana to leave on foot, but he impounded the vehicle
additionally noting that a patch cord was present on the passenger
seat (R. 119 at 8-9).
Prior to trial, police officers requested that Mr. Rains
come down to the police station to see if he could identify a
suspect in the burglary case. He consented and, upon arrival at the
station, was seated at an officer's desk.

Mr. Andrew Quintana was

then brought out by an officer and instructed to walk past Mr. Rains
while seated at his desk.

Mr. Rains told the police that

Mr. Quintana was the same man he had seen on the porch and in the
alley (R. 27-28).
Because of the suggestive procedure used by police to
show a single suspect to a witness, Mr. Quintana filed a motion in
limine to suppress the identification testimony of Mr. Rains
(R. 24-28, 31-35).

The trial court took the motion under advisement

(R. 39) and later issued an order granting the motion to suppress
the witness' identification and prohibiting its use at trial (R. 40)
At trial, however, the prosecutor stated in his opening
statement to the jury that Mr. Rains "saw the Defendant come out"
from the alley behind the John residence (R. 118 at 17). The
statement drew an immediate objection from defense counsel and a
conference was held at the bench (R. 118 at 17). The prosecutor
then continued his opening statement with similar statements of what
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Mr. Rains had observed (R. 118 at 17-18).-1

Before proceeding with

his opening statement, defense counsel asked for argument on the
side bar topic, and the jury was excused to accommodate that request
(R. 118 at 19).
Counsel for Mr. Quintana urged that the prosecutor's
remarks—that Mr. Rains saw the Defendant coming out of the
alley—left an indelible impression in the jurors' minds that
Mr. Rains identified Mr. Quintana as the perpetrator of the crimes;
counsel insisted that the prosecutor's remarks were in direct
violation of the court's order and moved for a mistrial (R. 118 at
19-20).

After brief argument, the trial court denied the motion

(R. 118 at 21).
At trial, Mrs. Rains testified that the man on the porch
was Andrew Quintana (R. 118 at 61). She later clarified that she
did not know Mr. Quintana but knew of him, and she admitted that she
had never met him (R. 118 at 61-62, 69-70).
The patch cords found in the burgundy pickup truck were
not positively identified by Mr. John as his patch cords (R. 118 at
33).

Testimony was introduced by Mr. Quintana's mother and brother

which indicated the patch cords belonged to Jack Quintana, the
Defendant's brother, and belonged to a portable amplifier which was
placed into evidence and which he routinely used in his truck
(R. 99; 119 at 41-42, 45-46).

1

See complete opening statement of prosecutor at

Addendum C.
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ARGUMENT

POINT. THE OPINION BY THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ERRONEOUSLY EVALUATED THE PROSECUTOR'S OPENING
STATEMENT COMMENTS IN VIOLATION OF THE COURT
ORDER, IGNORED CASES FROM THIS COURT ADDRESSING
THE ISSUES, AND IMPERMISSIBLY DENIED MR. QUINTANA
HIS RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL UNDER THE STATE AND
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS.
Prior to trial in this case, Mr. Quintana filed a motion
to suppress the identification of him by one Calvin Dean Rains
(R. 24-28, 31-35).

The trial court granted that motion (R. 40).

However, during the State's opening statement, the
prosecutor, despite the court order forbidding Mr. Rains to identify
Mr. Quintana as the burglar, informed jurors that Mr. Rains saw
Mr. Quintana come out of the alley behind the burglarized home
(R. 118 at 17). Mr. Quintana immediately moved for a mistrial
(R. 118 at 17, 19-20).

That motion was denied by the trial court

(R. 118 at 21) .
Mr. Quintana appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals
claiming that the prosecutor's remarks denied him his right to a
fair trial and required reversal of his convictions.
The State responded conceding that the prosecutor's
remarks were contrary to the order of the court and were erroneous.
Brief of Respondent at 12. The State urged, however, that the error
was harmless and did not prejudice Mr. Quintana.

Id.

The Court of Appeals on review also found the
prosecutor's opening statement comments to be highly improper and
erroneous misconduct.

Opinion at 6.

Nonetheless, the court found
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that the misconduct did not require reversal.

Opinion at 6-7.

This Court of Appeals1 opinion is ill based.

The Court

of Appeals erroneously evaluated the opening statement comments of
the prosecutor in direct violation of the court order precluding
that testimony from reaching the jurors.

Competent case law from

this Court, relied on by Mr. Quintana, was unaddressed by the Court
of Appeals on two critical issues, and an improper application of
the law was employed by the Court of Appeals on a third issue.
Specifically, Mr. Quintana avers that the Court of
Appeals failed in three critical analyses of this case:

(1) failed

to distinguish opening statement misconduct from closing argument
misconduct, (2) failed to properly address the prosecutor's
violation of the court's pretrial order, and (3) failed to apply the
correct legal standard to the facts of the case.

Individually and

collectively, these errors raise important questions of state and
federal law, now clouded by this opinion, which should be settled by
this Court.

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be granted

to resolve the issues and to afford Mr. Quintana his
constitutionally mandated fair trial.

A. THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO DISTINGUISH
OPENING STATEMENT MISCONDUCT FROM CLOSING ARGUMENT
MISCONDUCT.
The Court of Appeals relied on State v. Thomas, 111 Utah
Adv. Rep. 24 (Utah 1989), and State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah
1987), for its decision.

Both cases, however, are not dispositive

of the case at bar, although they do reiterate the two-part test for
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determining whether a prosecutor's misconduct requires reversal.
Nonetheless, both State v. Thomas and State v. Tillman, like so many
other cases in this jurisdiction (see, e.g., State v. Rislow, 736
P.2d 637 (Utah 1987); State v. Tucker, 727 P.2d 185 (Utah 1986);
State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985); and State v. Valdez, 513
P.2d 422 (Utah 1973)), involve closing argument misconduct of
prosecutors, not opening statement misconduct.

Moreover, none of

these cases involve the direct violation of court orders as
occurring in the case at bar.
In his briefs to the Court of Appeals, Mr. Quintana
emphasized the distinction between opening and closing arguments.
Mr. Quintana cited federal and state case law to support the
violation of his right to a fair trial.2

see Brief of Appellant at

9-16, enclosed at Addendum D.
Specifically, Mr. Quintana identified competent support
that a difference exists between prosecutorial misconduct in opening
statements and those which occur in closing arguments.

The Eighth

Circuit's opinion in United States v. Johnson, 767 F.2d 1259, 1274
(8th Cir. 1985), reasons that prosecutorial misconduct "made during
an opening statement makes it more egregious than a similar remark
would be in a closing argument."

The court further pointed out the

2

Because Mr. Quintana relied on both federal and state
law which analytically rely on federal due process analysis—none of
the cases note reliance on state due process—he believes footnote
no. 2 at page 6 of the court's opinion is in error. However,
Mr. Quintana also has urged that any harmless error analysis was
improper. See subpoint B, infra. If, however, this Court
disagrees, the federal standard should be evaluated as well.
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distinction between the two is that improprieties during closing
arguments may be excused as product of provocation while opening
statements take place in a less volatile atmosphere and are presumed
to be planned.

Id.

Additionally, Mr. Quintana relied on State v. Troy, 688
P.2d 483 (Utah 1984).

State v. Troy is a rare opinion among the

many prosecutorial misconduct cases in this jurisdiction where
opening statement comments were attacked as prejudicial misconduct.
This Court reversed the conviction in that case, particularly
relying on the opening statement remarks.3
The Court of Appeals1 opinion failed to address these
critical distinctions between opening statement and closing argument
misconduct.

Further, the court ignored the Troy opinion.

Accordingly, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be granted
so that this Court may review the error and address this important
issue.

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO ADEQUATELY
ADDRESS THE PROSECUTOR'S VIOLATION OF THE TRIAL
COURT'S ORDER.
Perhaps even more disquieting than the error noted above
is that the Court of Appeals failed to address the question of the

3

Only one other case, State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239,
1253-55 (Utah 1988), discusses alleged opening statement
misconduct. That case involved a discrepancy between the facts
proven and the opening statement proffer. The Court termed the
discrepancy as "so slight that it was not error." Id. at 1254.
Notably, the Lafferty case is readily distinguishable in any event
because it did not involve the violation of a trial court's
suppression order as occurred in the case at bar.
- 11 -

prosecutor's behavior in defiance of the trial court's pretrial
order to the contrary.
Applying a harmless error analysis to a prosecutor's
direct violation of a court order is contrary to the ends of justice
in this individual case as well as all other future cases,.4 In
State v. Ubaldi, 462 A.2d 1001 (Conn. 1983), cert, denied,, 464 U.S.
916 (1983)/ the Connecticut Supreme Court explained its refusal to
apply a harmless error analysis under similar circumstances:
The ultimate implication of [the harmless error
analysis] argument is that a state's attorney may
choose deliberately to ignore any trial court
ruling just as long as the state has amassed
overwhelming evidence of a defendant's guilt and
the state's attorney's misconduct relates only to
a portion of that evidence. We decline to place
such a restraint on the ability of this court to
defend the integrity of the judicial system.
Id. at 1007.
The Ubaldi court recognized the remedies and rationales
utilized in other jurisdictions on this issue and proffered the
following:
According to some authorities, the evil of
overzealous prosecutors is more appropriately
combatted through contempt sanctions, disciplinary
boards or other means. This court, however, has
long been of the view that it is ultimately
responsible for the enforcement of court rules in
prosecutorial misconduct cases. Upsetting a
criminal conviction is a drastic step, but it is

4

Mr. Quintana does not suggest by advancing this
argument that the facts against him were overwhelming. Mr, Quintana
continues to aver that the State's case against him was less than
compelling and that the prosecutorial misconduct, when analyzed
properly, demanded the mistrial motion be granted. See argument,
subpoint C, infra.
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the only feasible deterrent to flagrant
prosecutorial misconduct in defiance of a trial
court ruling.
Id. at 1009.

The Ubaldi court then offerred an explanation of why

the Court of Appeals' opinion in State v. Quintana is incorrect and
why it ill serves justice.

The Ubaldi court noted:

We are mindful of the sage admonition that
appellate rebuke without reversal ignores the
reality of the adversary system of justice. 'The
deprecatory words we use in our opinions . . . are
purely ceremonial.' Government counsel, employing
such tactics, are the kind who, eager to win
victories, will gladly pay the small price of a
ritualistic verbal spanking. 'The practice [of
verbal criticism without judicial action]—
recalling the bitter tears shed by the walrus as
he ate the oysters—breeds a deplorably cynical
attitude towards the judiciary.' Moreover,
' [deliberate prosecutorial misconduct is
presumably infrequent; to invalidate convictions
in the few cases where this is proved, even on a
fairly low showing of materiality, will have a
relatively small impact on the desired finality of
judgments and will deter conduct undermining the
integrity of the judicial system.'
Id. (citations omitted; brackets by the court).5
Importantly, cases from this Court support the view of
the Connecticut Supreme Court outlined in Ubaldi.

In State v.

Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146 (Utah 1981), the prosecutor raised the
appellant's failure to testify after the trial court repeatedly
sustained objections to the admission of such evidence.

After

concluding that the prosecutor's conduct violated the appellant's

5

It is not insignificant that the Court of Appeals'
opinion in this case was designated as "not for publication"
choosing to even further spare the prosecutor the slight
embarrassment of the judicial slap of his wrist and providing
further fodder for such behavior.
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right to remain silent, this Court found reversible error, stating:
The continued attempts by the prosecutor to put
the defendant's silence before the jury after his
having been advised of his right to remain silent
amounts to prosecutorial misconduct.
The references to defendant's silence are
fundamental error, which could have affected the
result and are therefore prejudicial.
Id. at 147
In State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261 (Utah 1980), a capital
case, the trial court instructed an attorney witness that hearsay on
hearsay evidence would not be permitted in the penalty phase because
of its lack of probative value.

Despite the trial court's ruling,

the prosecutor and his attorney witness did not honor the ruling.
Id. at 270. This Court noted:
We cannot say that the errors that occurred here
were harmless. An inflammatory obscenity was
inaccurately imputed to the defendant in the
penalty phase, which arose from a violation of the
District Court's order.
Id. at 271. Because the error worked prejudice to the
defendant—was not harmless—the Court reversed the sentence of
death.

Id.
Other jurisdictions concur with the concept that

violation of a court order to avoid prejudicing the case against the
accused requires a reversal of the conviction.

A Texas court has

stated:
When the court has ruled on a point, the same
evidence should not again be offered in the
presence of the jury . . . there is a duty upon
the court to rule decisively. When error creeps
into the record, the court should instruct the
jury to disregard it. The judge must do more. He
must enforce his rulings. Violations of a court's
- 14 -

solemn rulings should "lead to serious
consequences."
Cody v. Mustang Oil Tool Co., 595 S.W.2d 214, 215 (Tex. Civ. App.
1980).

The Washington Supreme Court was even more direct:
If we are persuaded that a prosecuting attorney or
a witness for the state is deliberately trying to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, we will
assume that he succeeded in his purpose and grant
a new trial. It would seem that our frequent
discussions of this subject could, within the near
future, serve to prevent the reference to a
defendant as being on parole by all except the
willful or the congenitally ignorant.

State v. Nettleton, 400 P.2d 301, 303 n.4 (Wash. 1965).

See also

State v. Smith, 65 P.2d 1075 (Wash. 1937) (court reversed conviction
because the prosecutor asked a question which at a motion in limine
had been ruled improper by trial court).
The case against Mr. Quintana involved the single issue
of identification; all parties agreed on that point.

The trial

court found that the suggestive identification procedure utilized
with Mr. Rains violated Mr. Quintana's due process rights and ruled
that his identification must be suppressed.

The identification was

suppressed because its introduction, under the circumstances, would
have prejudiced Mr. Quintana.

Neither the State nor the Court of

Appeals took issue with the trial court's order suppressing the
identification.

It becomes difficult to understand how the

suppressed identification, when revealed to the jury by the
prosecutor during his opening statement, is now cleansed of
prejudice to Mr. Quintana.

Because of the centrality of the issue

of identification to this case and the violation of the trial
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court's order, much like the right to remain silent violation in
State v, Wiswell and the hearsay upon hearsay violation of State v,
Brown, the harmless error analysis is inappropriate.
was prejudiced.

Mr. Quintana

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be

granted and his convictions should be reversed.

C. THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO APPLY THE
CORRECT LEGAL STANDARD TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF
THIS CASE.
The Court of Appeals opined that because the prosecutor
made only one illicit identification reference to the defendant—and
that the reference was very early in the two-day trial—that the
error somehow becomes benign. Opinion at 5-6.

The Court of Appeals

further suggests that compelling evidence otherwise cleansed the
prosecutorial misconduct error.

Both contentions are erroneous.

In State v. Troy, a case heavily relied on by
Mr. Quintana and unaddressed by the Court of Appeals, this Court
stated the two-prong test for reversing a prosecutorial misconduct
case as follows:
The test of whether the remarks made by counsel
are so objectionable as to merit a reversal in a
criminal case is, (1) did the remarks call to the
attention of jurors matters which they would not
be justified in considering in determining their
verdict, (2) and were they, under the
circumstances of the particular case, probably
influenced by those remarks.
688 P.2d at 486 (citing, inter alia, State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d at
426).

A discussion of prong one of the test is unnecessary as all

parties and even the Court of Appeals agreed that prong was met.
Opinion at 6.

In State v. Troy, this Court offerred additional and
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very helpful information in analyzing prong two of this two-part
test.

The Court noted:
Step two is more difficult [than step one]
and involves a consideration of the circumstances
of the case as a whole. In making such a
consideration, it is appropriate to look at the
evidence of defendant's guilt.
If proof of defendant's guilt is strong the
challenged conduct or remark will not be presumed
prejudicial. Likewise in a case with less
compelling proof, this court will more closely
scrutinize the conduct. If the conclusion of the
jurors is based on their weighing conflicting
evidence or evidence susceptible of differing
interpretations, there is a greater likelihood
that they will be improperly influenced through
remarks of counsel. Indeed, in such cases, the
jurors may be searching for guidance in weighing
and interpreting the evidence. They may be
especially susceptible to influence, and a small
degree of influence may be sufficient to affect
the verdict.

Id. at 486 (emphasis added).
Notably, the phrasing of prong two in State v. Troy is
somewhat different than that recited by the Court of Appeals from
State v. Thomas.
same.

Nonetheless, the substance of prong two is the

Critically important in the Court's explanation of prong two

in State v. Troy, however, is that no deference is to be given to
the jury's verdict when analyzing a prosecutorial misconduct
statement; rather, the more conflicting the evidence and/or the more
susceptible the evidence is of differing interpretations, then the
greater the likelihood of influence by the remarks or, as phrased in
State v. Thomas, the more likely there would be a more favorable
result for the defendant.
The analysis under prong two of State v. Troy is
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distinctively different than that applied to a sufficiency of the
evidence challenge.

The Court of Appeals properly deferred to the

jury's verdict in responding to the insufficient evidence claim
because when conducting that analysis, it is correct to assume the
jury resolved the conflicts in the evidence in accordance with the
verdict.

However, by examining the Court of Appeals1 treatment of

the insufficient evidence claim, the number of conflicts in the
evidence in this case and their significance is displayed.

The

Court of Appeals repeatedly addressed the contradicting evidence by
indicating that the jurors could have adopted the State's suggested
inference or could have believed the State's witness(es) and
disbelieved the defense witness(es).

Opinion at 7-9.

The Court of Appeals' resolution of the insufficient
evidence claim effectively demonstrates that the evidence against
Mr. Quintana was conflicting and susceptible of differing
interpretations. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals should have
applied State v. Troy's second prong recognizing that the
prosecutor's comments were more than sufficient to influence jurors
on how to resolve the conflicts.

Because the Court of Appeals

failed to recognize the distinction between a State v. Troy analysis
and an insufficiency of evidence claim, it did not correctly
scrutinize the prosecutor's conduct.

After all, the Troy Court

expressly noted that "a small degree of influence may be sufficient
to affect the verdict."

688 P.2d at 486.

Mr. Quintana avers that the prosecutor's comments were
much more than a small degree of improper influence.
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He believes

the error to have been determinative and insists that the Court of
Appeals misapprehended the facts of the case to the contrary.
Particularly strained in the opinion is the treatment given to the
testimony and identification of Mr. Quintana by Mrs. Rains.
Mr. Quintana especially challenges the court's assessment that she
supplied the identification evidence buttressed by Mr. Rains1
"permissible testimony" that the man in the alley was the same man
both of them saw on the porch moments earlier.

Opinion at 6.

The Court of Appeals failed to address that the actual
buttressing on this point comes not from Mr. Rains but from the
prosecutor who made the identification of Mr. Quintana as the
culprit against the order of the court.

Alone, the testimony of

Mrs. Rains is uncompelling and questionable support for maintaining
the convictions against Mr. Quintana.

Even the Court of Appeals

recognized that Patricia Rains was not very articulate in describing
the basis for her recognition of Mr. Quintana.

Opinion at 7.

While

her testimony may not have been improbable, a reasonable jury would
have required more than the information she provided to convict a
man of these crimes beyond a reasonable doubt.

They had more, the

identification provided by the prosecutor in defiance of the court
order.
Mr. Quintana also complains that the critical information
in Mrs. Rains1 testimony that she had supplied the name Andy or
Andrew Quintana to the police officers during the initial report of
the burglary is wholly unreliable.

Both police officers who

testified where unable to recall a name supplied in any of the
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reports or broadcasts.

That fact alone points out the unlikelihood

that jurors would have relied heavily on her testimony.

As all

other evidence in this case was contradicted, the illicit
identification "testimony" by the prosecutor resolved the issue for
the jurors in favor of the convictions.
Even assuming the jurors could have believed all of
Mrs. Rains' testimony regarding Mr. Quintana, that evidence only
placed him on the porch and in the truck.

When Mr. Rains testified,

the jurors made the connection to Mr. Quintana that was supplied to
them during the opening statement by the prosecutor.

Accordingly,

under either version of the second prong of State v. Troy or
State v. Thomas, Mr. Quintana merits reconsideration of his claims
and reversal of his convictions.

The Petition for Writ of

Certiorari should be granted to correct the errors and oversights by
the Court of Appeals.

CONCLUSION
For all or any of the foregoing reasons, Appellant,
Mr. Andrew Quintana, requests that this Court grant his Petition for
Writ of Certiorari and review his case.
Respectfully submitted this /Q
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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No.-880405-CA
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Andrew R. Quintana,
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Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Raymond S. Uno
Attorneys:

Lynn R. Brown and Richard G. Uday, Salt Lake
City, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Charlene Barlow, Salt Lake
City, for Respondent

Before Judges Garff, Jackson, and Bullock. 1
JACKSON, Judge:
Defendant Andrew R. Quintana appeals from the judgment and
conviction of burglary and theft entered on a jury verdict. We
affirm.

According to the evidence presented at t r i a l , the Ted John
family returned to t h e i r S a l t Lake County home on Emery Street
from a two-day trip in the early evening of September 27, 1987.
A note on their door informed them that the home had been
burglarized and asked them to contact the p o l i c e . After
inventorying their belongings, Ted John reported that a vacuum
cleaner worth $100 and s t e r e o equipment worth $300 were missing.
The vacuum cleaner was 3-4* high and 14-13" across at the base.
The s t e r e o equipment c o n s i s t e d of patch cords and three
1, J. Robert Bullock, Senior D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g by special
appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(1) (j) (1987).

Yamaha components, including an amplifier and cassette player
(each measuring 14" wide by 6" tall by 10" deep and weighing
10-15 lbs. and 4 lbs., respectively) and a tuner (measuring 14"
by 3" by 10" and weighing 2 lbs.).
At approximately 11:30 the same morning, Patricia Rains, a
neighbor who lived across the street from the Johns, was
returning from the grocery storeo As she turned onto her street,
she noticed a burgundy Mazda pickup truck parked on the street
and a man in a tank top and colorful Bermuda shorts looking at
her from the porch of the Johns' home, approximately 30' away.
In the course of unloading her groceries from her car, she saw
the individual knock on the Johns' front door, wait for an
answer, look in the picture window, and open the mailbox lid.
Once inside her apartment, she continued to watch the man through
her front bay window, approximately 85-100' from the Johns' front
porch, along with her husband, Calvin Dean Rains. She saw the
man walk off the porch and over to the burgundy truck.
Calvin Dean Rains testified that, while looking out his
apartment window for his wife on the morning of September 27,
1987, he saw a man in a late-model, dark maroon Mazda or Nissan
pickup truck, with lowered suspension and a broken front grille
on the driver's side, park down the street from the Johns' home
and walk up their driveway. The man was Spanish or Mexican,
approximately 5'6" or 5'7" tall, in his mid-20's, with black
semi-wavy hair. He wore multicolor Bermuda shorts and a baggy
T-shirt with sleeves and an emblem on one side. The man went
onto the porch, looked in the window, looked in the mailbox,
opened the screen door, and tried the knob on the front door. He
then returned to the truck and backed it down the street and
around the corner out of sight.
A few minutes later, Calvin Dean Rains went to his truck to
return to the grocery store for some forgotten items. He pulled
around the corner and spotted the same maroon pickup truck parked
across from the alley that ran behind the Johns' home.
Suspicious, he did a U-turn and stopped his own truck near the
alleyway and waited a few minutes. From 75 or 80 yards away, he
saw the man who had been on the front porch come out of the
alleyway. When the man saw Rains, he immediately turned around
and began walking in the opposite direction. After taking
several steps, the man again turned around completely and walked
directly to the burgundy Mazda. He looked like he was carrying
something under his shirt because he had a large bulge under the
left side of his baggy shirt that was supported by his arm.
The
man got into the pickup and, after a few moments, drove away past
Rains•
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Rains returned to his home and told his wife that someone
had been robbed. They then went with another neighbor to the
back of the Johns' home, where they found an open window and door
and a screen on the grass. The tall weeds near the four foot
high picket fence that separates the Johns' property from the
alleyway had been trampled down, making it appear that someone
had walked through them and climbed over the fence. They
returned to their home and Patricia Rains called the police,
providing a description of the man and the truck, the name Andy
Quintana, and the license number 5600AK, which Calvin Rains had
remembered and written down on a piece of paper.
A police dispatch was sent out at about noon concerning a
burglary at the John residence. The suspect was described as a
male Hispanic with dark hair, approximately 5° 7" and 130 lbs.
The vehicle was described as a maroon Mazda pickup, license
number 5600AK, with chrome trim and damage to the grille area.
The officer who responded to the dispatch did not recall being
given the name of the man seen at the Johns' residence.
When Officer Robert Robinson came on duty that afternoon,
his supervisor told him of the burglary and gave him the vehicle
description, the probable license plate number, and a description
of the suspect as a short, male Hispanic in his twenties, wearing
a shirt and shorts. He was also told that the suspect vehicle
belonged to "the Quintanas," but he did not recall being given a
first name. At 3:00 that afternoon, Officer Robinson stopped a
truck fitting the description, but with license number 3600AK.
The driver, who identified himself as Andrew R. Quintana, was
wearing a blue pullover shirt and grey Bermuda shorts. Robinson
checked the registration of the pickup and found that it was
registered in the name of Jack N. Quintana, defendant's brother.
The officer stated the reason for the stop. Defendant explained
that he and the truck had been at his home all morning, a few
blocks from where he was stopped, until he went to his sister's
on Shannon Circle at about 2:00 p.m. to help move a washing
machine- As the officer continued his questioning, defendant
altered his story somewhat. When Robinson asked him if the
pickup had been on Emery Street, defendant said that he had a
sister, Irene, who lived on that street, but denied being there
that day. Then he mentioned that he had helped a sister in the
morning. By the end of the conversation with Officer Robinson,
however, defendant had reverted to claiming he was at his own
home all morning and had helped his sister on Shannon Circle in
the afternoon. Robinson decided to impound the pickup and the
patch cords he saw on the passenger's seat of the pickup, and
defendant left on foot.
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Defendant's sister, Gerline, testified that defendant had
come to her home on Shannon Circle on either Saturday, September
27, or Sunday, September 28, at about 1:45 p.m. to help move her
washer and dryer. He was wearing grey shorts and a T-shirt. He
was alone in the the maroon Mazda pickup, which she described as
riding low to the ground. Defendant's mother testified that
defendant lives with her and that she washes his clothing. She
stated that defendant did not have any Bermuda shorts with
multiple colors or any shorts that came down to his knees and no
bulky tank tops or T-shirts with emblems or writing on them.
When she and her husband left their home on September 27 at 10:15
a.m., defendant was asleep; he was, as far as she knew, also
asleep when they returned at about 11:45 a.m. She also verified
that defendant has a sister, Irene, who lives around the corner
from the Johns1 residence, but on Illinois Avenue, not Emery
Street.
Jack Quintana testified that he owned the maroon and chrome
Mazda pickup, which rides low in the back and is missing a front
grille, in which defendant was stopped. He identified the patch
cords introduced by the State as his own, explaining that he uses
them to connect a portable amplifier, which was introduced at
trial, to his cassette player in the truck and to his stereo in
his home. He had last seen the patch cords at the bottom of the
truck seat on September 11, 1987, the day he was incarcerated as
a result of a theft conviction that month. Finally, an
investigator testified that the defendant is 5'4-3/4" tall in
sneakers.
I.
At trial, Patricia Rains identified the man she saw on the
Johns' porch as the defendant, asserting that she recognized him
as Andy Quintana as soon as she saw him there and that she
recognized the truck he was driving. She stated that sh€*
provided the police with his name when she called them. When
asked on cross-examination how she knew defendant, she said that
she had never met him, but knew of him, and asserted that: he
might have been to her home with her little sister, although she
was not sure. In response to defense counsel's question about
when the last time was that she had seen him prior to seeing him
at the Johns' residence, she confusingly responded, "Two or three
days ago." When pressed on redirect to explain how she put the
name Andy Quintana on the face she saw on September 27, she
stated that she was familiar with the face because she had seen
him around. She suggested that he had been pointed out to her on
the street and named by her sisters. She claimed that she had
seen him several times before September 27.
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During the investigation of the John burglary, Calvin Dean
Rains was called to the police station to see if he could
identify a suspect in the crime. Defendant was brought into a
room by a police officer and walked past the desk at which Rains
was sitting. Rains identified defendant as the man he had seen
at the Johns residence on September 27. Because of the highly
"suggestive nature of this identification process, the trial court
granted defendant's pretrial motion to suppress and issued an
order prohibiting the State from using the testimony of Calvin
Dean Rains to identify Andrew Quintana.
During the course of his opening statement to the jury, the
prosecutor, Ernest Jones, told the jury of the Rainses'
observations of a man on the Johns* porch and that Patricia Rains
had told the police that she knew who the man was, i.e., the
defendant Andrew Quintana. The prosecutor then stated, "Well,
Mr. and Mrs. Rains watched the defendant" and went on to decribe
the man's movements on the porch and Mr. Rains's subsequent
actions in getting into his own truck and eventually parking by
the alleyway after seeing the maroon Mazda parked there. The
prosecutor continued: "And he said that the defendant was out of
sight. He didn't know exactly where the defendant had gone, but
essentially he said he saw him come out."
Defense counsel objected at this point, and a conference was
held at the bench. When Jones continued his opening statement,
he referred to the person seen by Rains coming out of the
alleyway as "the man," not as "the defendant." At the close of
the prosecutor's opening remarks, the jury was excused and
defendant moved for a mistrial, asserting that the State had just
accomplished an identification of the defendant by Mr. Rains
through the prosecutor's statement that it was prohibited by
court order from introducing through Mr. Rains's direct testimony.
On appeal, Quintana contends that the prosecutor's remarks
during opening statement constituted misconduct requiring
reversal of his conviction and remand for a new trial. The Utah
Supreme Court has recently reiterated that a prosecutor's actions
or remarks constitute misconduct meriting reversal if
(1) the actions or remarks call to the
attention of the jurors matters they would
not be justified in considering in
determining their verdict and (2) under
the circumstances of the particular case,
the error is substantial and prejudicial
such that there is a reasonable likelihood
that in its absence there would have been
a more favorable result for the defendant.
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State v. Thomas, 111 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 25 (1989); accord State
v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987). 2
There is. no question that the prosecutor's statements
concerning Mr. Rains's observations of defendant, quoted above,
were highly improper in light of the court's pretrial order
prohibiting the State from using any identification testimony
by Mr. Rains. Thus, the first part of the test set forth in
State v. Thomas is satisfied. However, although we do not
condone the prosecutor's misconduct in this case, we conclude
that his remarks did not substantially prejudice defendant
under the circumstances.
The improper remarks to the jury occurred in the first few
minutes of this two-day trial. The prosecutor began his
opening statement by telling the jury that the comments of
attorneys during opening statements are not evidence. When he
reached the point of describing how the Rainses watched a man
on the Johns' front porch, he said that Patricia Rains told the
police she knew the man was Andrew Quintana. The prosecutor
then made the improper, but isolated, remarks about Mr. Rains
seeing the defendant. After defendant's objection and the
conference at the bench, the prosecutor restricted his
references to Mthe man" in describing what Calvin Dean Rains
saw and said. When defense counsel proceeded with his own
opening statement, he again cautioned the jury that what the
attorneys say is not evidence. During his subsequent
testimony, Calvin Dean Rains described only what he observed
and made no attempt to testify that the man he saw at the
Johns' residence was, in fact, defendant. He did give
permissible testimony that the man he saw on the front porch of
the Johns' home was the same man he saw come out of the
alleyway behind their home several minutes later with a Large
bulge under his baggy shirt. It was Patricia Rains who
identified defendant for the jury as the man she saw on the
Johns' porch and who testified that she recognized him on the
day of the burglary because his face was familiar to her.
Although these surrounding circumstances and all the
evidence presented at trial do not excuse the prosecutor's
misconduct, they convince us that his remarks did not taint the
2. Defendant does not contend that the prosecutor's remarks
resulted in error amounting to a violation of his federal
constitutional rights. Such errors require reversal unless
they are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Tuttle,
106 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 12 (1989).
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proceedings to the extent that, if they had not occurred, there
is any reasonable likelihood that the jury would have decided
the case differently. See State v. Mitchell, 116 Utah Adv.
Rep. 3, 6 (1989).
II.
Quintana next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his conviction for the burglary and theft at the Johns'
residence. Specifically, he contends that there is
insufficient evidence to identify him as the person who
committed the crimes or to connect him with any of the property
stolen from the Johns.
In considering such a claim, we view the evidence presented
and all inferences that can be drawn therefrom in the light
most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Gardner, 101
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 10 (1989). This court will reverse a jury
conviction only when the evidence, viewed in this light, "'is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted.'M
State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1128 (Utah 1989) (quoting State
v. Marcum, 750 P.2d 599, 601 (Utah 1988)).
We reject Quintana's attack on Patricia Rains's
identification of him as "inherently unreliable." She saw the
man on the Johns' porch from only 30' away as she turned into
her driveway, and she watched his actions from her driveway for
several minutes. It is insignificant that Patricia Rains
described the man as being just over an inch taller than
defendant is in sneakers. It is equally uncompelling that,
although she described the man as wearing bright, multicolored
Bermuda shorts, defendant was stopped three hours later wearing
grey shorts. He had ample opportunity and reason to change
clothes in the interim. The jury did not have to believe his
mother's testimony that he does not own the type of shorts
described by the Rainses.
In addition to Patricia Rains's in-court identification,
the jury could also consider her testimony that she recognized
the man on the porch as Andy Quintana as soon as she saw him
there. She made it clear that she-had seen him several times
in her neighborhood before September 27, 1987, and that
defendant had been pointed out to her and named by one of her
sisters. The likelihood of such an occurrence was highlighted
by the testimony of defendant's mother that one of his sisters
lived very near the Rainses. Although Patricia Rains was not
very articulate in describing the basis for her recogition of
defendant that day, her testimony was neither inconclusive nor
improbable.
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There is also sufficient evidence in the record from which
the jury could find that defendant obtained or exercised
unauthorized control over the Johns* property. A vacuum
cleaner, three stereo components, and patch cords were
missing. The three components, if stacked, measured 14" wide
by 10" deep by 15" tall and weighed, at most, 21 lbs. The
witnesses testified about the physical condition of the home
and yard, from which it could be inferred that someone had
broken into the house through the rear window, taken the Johns*
property, left through the back door, walked through the weeds,
and vaulted the picket fence, described by Ted John as being as
tall or a little shorter than the courtroom railing.3 The
man whom Calvin Dean Rains had initially seen on the front
porch, identified as defendant by Rains*s wife, emerged from
the alley behind the Johns* home a short time later with a
large bulge under his shirt that could have been the stereo
equipment. He acted suspiciously by changing directions after
seeing Rains watching him and then promptly changing directions
again.
Defendant was later stopped in a truck substantially
matching the Rainses* description, including all but one number
in the license plate, with patch cords on the front seat. Ted
John described these cords as similar to his own, although he
could not positively identify them as his. Even without such a
positive identification of the patch cords by Ted John, and
even if the jury found that the patch cords introduced at trial
belonged to defendant's brother, there was ample evidence from
which the jury could find all the elements of theft as set
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978).
Quintana's other two issues on appeal involve Jury
Instruction 19, given over defendant's timely objections:
Possession of recently stolen
property, if not satisfactorily explained,
is ordinarily a circumstance from which

3. Ted John also described a gate in the fence, but the
location of that gate in relation to the Johns* fence or the
alley is unclear. The diagram to which he referred during his
testimony, although introduced by the State at trial, is not in
the record on appeal.
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you may reasonably draw the inference and
find, in light of the surrounding
circumstances shown by the evidence of the
case, that the person in possession knew
the property had been stolen.
Thus if you find from the evidence
and beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendant was in possession of stolen
property, that such possession was not too
remote in point of time from the theft,
and the defendant made no satisfactory
explanation of such possession, then you
may infer from those facts that the
defendant committed the theft.
You may use the same inference, if
you find it justified by the evidence, to
connect the possessor of recently stolen
property with the offense of burglary.
Quintana contends that the trial court erred by giving this
instruction because there is no factual basis in the record to
support it. See State v. Howland, 761 P.2d 579, 580 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988). He bases this argument on Ted John's failure to
testify that the patch cords taken from the impounded truck
were his patch cords. We believe there is adequate evidence in
the record to support this instruction. In light of Ted John's
identification of the cords as similar to his and the other
testimony regarding the identification of defendant and his
truck at the Johns' residence a few hours before he was
stopped, there was evidence from which the jury could have
concluded that the patch cords seized were, in fact, those
stolen from the Johns. The jury was free to disbelieve Jack
Quintana's testimony that the patch cords in evidence were his.
Finally, defendant asserts that Instruction 19 violated his
state and federal constitutional rights to due process because
it created an irrebuttable presumption relieving the State of
its burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We
conclude that this issue is completely meritless. Instruction
19 does not use the "prima facie evidence" language in Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) (1978), which was held to create an
unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption in State v. Chambers,
709 P.2d 321, 326 (Utah 1985). The first paragraph of
Instruction 19 does not create an irrebuttable presumption that
the person who is inexplicably in possession of stolen property
stole that property. Like the instruction held not to be
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constitutionally defective in State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452
(Utah 1987), Instruction 19 simply allowed the jury to infer,
if it found that the defendant was in possession of stolen
property without satisfactory explanation, that he stole such
property. Such an inference is not constitutionally
impermissible, I£. at 456; State v. Graves, 717 P.2d 717 (Utah
1986).
Affirmed.
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ADDENDUM C

direct examination, State will cross-examine.

After they

have rested, the State may have some rebuttal witnesses, and
the defense may have some surrebuttal witnesses.
After both sides have rested, then the Court will
read the instructions to you.

After the instructions are

read, then they both have an opportunity to make a closing
statement to you.

Since the State has the burden of proof,

they will make the first opening statement.

Then the de-

fense will have only one opportunity to address you.

And

they will have to anticipate what the State will say on
rebuttal—after they have finished their closing statement,
I should say, then the State will have an opportunity to
make the final rebuttal closing statement.
Then the matter will be submitted to you to
deliberate on.

I should advise you that if you wish to, you

may take notes on this particular case.

And when you take

notes, do not share those notes with anyone else until you
get into the jury room.

And keep those notes confidential

all during the course of the trial until you go out to
deliberate.

Okay.

You may proceed.

MR. JONES:

Members of the jury, at the beginning

of every trial, the Court always allows each party, both the
prosecution and defense a chance to make what is called an
opening statement.
As Judge Uno told you, the comments of attorneys
13

[OPENING STATEMENT OF PROSECUTOR]

1

d u r i n g a n o p e n i n g s t a t e m e n t , o f c o u r s e , a r e n o t evidence.

2

E v i d e n c e c o m e s from the w i t n e s s e s w h o a r e c a l l e d to t e s t i f y ,

3

o r i t m a y c o m e in t h e form of a n y e x h i b i t s that are received

4

5

in evidence.
A n d the p u r p o s e o f a n o p e n i n g s t a t e m e n t is simply

6

to give you an idea of what this case is all about, and to

7

e x p l a i n to y o u w h a t w e a n t i c i p a t e t h e t e s t i m o n y will b e .

8

y o u k n o w , t h i s is a c a s e involving b u r g l a r y and theft.

9

is s o m e o n e b r e a k i n g into s o m e o n e e l s e ' s h o m e and taking

That

10

p r o p e r t y that d o e s n ' t belong t o t h e m .

11

h a p p e n e d just o v e r a y e a r a g o o r j u s t u n d e r a year a g o —

12

e x c u s e m e - — i n S e p t e m b e r of 1 9 8 7 .

13

t h i s d i a g r a m o f t h e a r e a t h a t ' s in q u e s t i o n .

14

T h i s particular

As

case

A n d w e w i l l b e offering

T h e d i a g r a m e s s e n t i a l l y i n v o l v e s w h a t is called

15

E m e r y S t r e e t and I l l i n o i s A v e n u e h e r e .

W h a t y o u have is a

16

m a n n a m e d Ted J o h n and h i s w i f e w e r e l i v i n g in this home a t

17

1 1 6 2 Emery S t r e e t .

18

m o r n i n g the 25th o f S e p t e m b e r , a n d h a d b e e n gone for a

19

c o u p l e of d a y s .

20

up the home.

2i

W h e n they came back o n Sunday a f t e r n o o n , sometime between

22

4:00 and 6:00, they noticed t h e r e w a s a n o t i c e o n the d o o r ,

T h e y had left o n , I think it w a s , Friday

A n d of course w h e n t h e y l e f t , they locked

N o t h i n g w a s m i s s i n g , n o t h i n g had been t a k e n .

23 I e s s e n t i a l l y saying that t h e p o l i c e h a d b e e n t h e r e .
24
25

A n d a b o u t the same t i m e , o n e of the neighbors came
o v e r a n d in e s s e n c e told M r . J o h n t h a t , h e y , somebody h a s
14

1

broken into your house.

2

Well, Mr. John, of course, started to do an inven-

3

tory inside the home.

4

missing was his stereo system.

5

tuner and cassette

6

at, oh, somewhere between seven and $900.

7

discovered that of all things a vacuum cleaner had been

8

taken in this burglary.

9 I

And essentially what he discovered

player.

There was an amplifier, a

All of these items were valued
In addition they

Mr. John discovered that someone had removed one

10

of the screens on the window in the kitchen, and concluded

11

that that was probably the point of entry.

12

The police had already been there, had already

13

dusted the house for fingerprints, and had left.

14

course, contacted the police and gave them some information.

15

He, of

One of the things that the investigators dis-

16

covered in working on the case—the police department—was

17

that across the street from Ted's house—they live at 1162,

18

and it is here 1173—that is a d u p l e x — a young couple named

19

Dean and Patricia Rains lived.

20

Dean and Patricia, and Mr. and Mrs. Rains said that on

21

Sunday morning at about eleven, 11:30, right in this area,

22

that they had observed a man coming down the street and

And the officer talked to

23 j coming up on the porch here at the home that belonged to Ted
24
25 J

John.
Mrs. Rains told the officers that she knew who
15

1

that m a n w a s .

2

said that he w e n t up o n the porch for a few m i n u t e s .

3

appeared to be looking through the w i n d o w s .

4

over by the d o o r , s p e n t a couple of m i n u t e s a t the door,

5

then h e came d o w n off the porch.

6

It w a s this d e f e n d a n t , A n d r e w Quintana.

She
Ee

Then he went

W e l l , M r . and M r s . Rains w a t c h e d the defendant.

7

Ke c a m e down off the porch and he c a m e back up to the

8

corner.

9

parked there a small 1983 Mazda p i c k u p .

Near the corner of Emery and I l l i n o i s , he had
And they said that

10

he got into the p i c k u p and then he b a c k e d across the street,

11

through the intersection of Illinois and Emery, made a

12

right-hand t u r n , w h i c h would be sending him westbound, and

13

p a r k e d the car down in this vicinity.

14

the d i a g r a m .

15

Down at the end of

M r . R a i n s , of course, was c u r i o u s to know what he

16

was doing.

17

so w h a t happened is M r . Rains got into h i s vehicle and drove

18

up to the corner and came this same w a y , westbound along

19

Illinois.

20

imately h e r e .

2i

He said there was something just not right, and

Ke said that he noticed the p i c k u p parked approx-

Now, this area on the d i a g r a m is an alleyway.

22 I is not a very biq alley.
23

down i t .

It

He couldn't d r i v e a car or truck

There w a s a lot of weeds and d e b r i s and everything

24 I in the alleyway.
25 I

M r . Rains came d o w n , made a U-turn and parked on
16

1

the other side of the Illinois Street, right next to that

2

alley.

3

didn't know exactly where the defendant had gone, but

4

MR. BROWN:
Your Honor.

7

Excuse me.

I object to that argument,

May we approach the bench?

THE COURT:

8

Yes.
(Conference at the bench.)

9 I
10

MR. BROWN:

Thank you.

MR. JONES:

By the way, Mr. Rains, as I mentioned,

11

is sitting here in his vehicle, and he sees this man come

12

out in the area here on the diagram, which is almost adja-

13

cent to where Ted John lives.

14

came out, he appeared to be wearing some kind of a baggy

15

shirt, something like a large T-shirt.

16

something up underneath that T-shirt.

17

ly when he saw the suspect, he kind of hesitated for a

18

minute, almost as if he was going to turn and go the other

19

way.

20

And he said that when the man

Appeared there was
He said that initial-

Then he turned around and came back down the alleyway.
He walked right in front of Mr. Rains and went

21

over and got into something inside that 1983 Mazda pickup

22

and took off.

23 J

Ee

essentially he said he saw him come out.

5
6

And he said that the defendant was out of sight.

Well, Mr. Rains went back to his wife, told her to

24 I call the police, and then he went over to Ted John's house
25 I and discovered that the back door was opened and went in and
17

1

a p p e a r e d someone had b e e n in t h e r e , i n s i d e the h o u s e .

2

w a i t e d and the p o l i c e e v e n t u a l l y

3

He

arrived.

O n e of the things that M r . R a i n s w a s able to do

*

w a s to jot d o w n a license plate n u m b e r for this 1983 pickup

5

truck.

6

police department.

He w r o t e t h a t d o w n and gave t h a t information to the

7

L a t e r t h a t same a f t e r n o o n , a b o u t 3:00, there was

8

an O f f i c e r R o b i n s o n w h o w a s on d u t y , and had received

some

9

of the information c o n c e r n i n g this b u r g l a r y , w h i c h had been

10

r e p o r t e d a b o u t 11:30 or 12:00c

n

v e h i c l e m a t c h i n g the d e s c r i p t i o n of the o n e w h i c h had been

12

r e p o r t e d , a m a r o o n 1983 M a z d a p i c k u p .

13

O f f i c e r Robinson, observed a

H e stopped the v e h i c l e .

T h e p e r s o n who was

14

d r i v i n g the v e h i c l e w a s A n d r e w Q u i n t a n a .

15

e l s e in the v e h i c l e .

16

There w a s no one

H e c o n d u c t e d a search and found nothing in the

17

v e h i c l e as far as the property w h i c h had b e e n reported

18

missing.

19

M e m b e r s o f the jury, that in e s s e n c e is the c a s e .

20

The p r o p e r t y w a s n o t r e c o v e r e d .

It n e v e r h a s been re-

2i

covered.

22

this case tells y o u that there is o n l y o n e p e r s o n who is

23

a c t u a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e for the b r e a k - i n , the b u r g l a r y , the

24

t h e f t of the p r o p e r t y , and that is this d e f e n d a n t , Andrew

25

Quintana.

B u t I s u b m i t to you that the e v i d e n c e you have in

18

1

Thank you.

2

MR. BROWN:

Before I give my statement, Your

3

Honor, I think we should deal with what we talked about on

4

the side bar.
THE COURT:

5

All right.

6

jury step out one moment.

7

wishes to make at this time.

If we can just have the

There is a motion that defense

(Jury outside the courtroom.)

8
MR. BROWN:

9

Your Honor, at this time, pursuant to

10

our conversation at the side bar, the Court indicated that

11

I could make a motion at this time and have the same force

12

and effect as if it had been made when we approached the

13

bench; is that correct?

14

THE COURT:

Yes.

15

MR. BROWN:

And the reason I ask to approach the

16

bench at that time, Your Honor, is because Mr. Jones, in his

17

opening statement, indicated—told the jury that Mr. Rains

18

saw the defendant when he made reference to the defendant

19

coming out of the alley.

20

defendant.

21

prior motion of the defendant, has suppressed the witness

22

identification of Mr. Rains, and has signed an order that

23

Mr. Rains cannot make any identification of the defendant.

24

Can f t make an eyewitness identification of the defendant.

25

Ke said that Mr. Rains saw the

Now, that's critical because the Court, on a

Mr. Jones's statement to the jury certainly,

19

ADDENDUM D

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The prosecutor's opening statement constituted misconduct
when, in direct contradiction to the trial court's order suppressing
a witness1 identification of Mr. Quintana, the prosecutor informed
the jurors that the witness in question saw Mr. Quintana, thereby
connecting in the minds of the jurors the identification evidence he
could not legally elicit from the witness.

The prosecutor's

misconduct prejudiced Mr. Quintana and requires reversal of his
convictions and a new trial ordered.
Insufficient evidence was presented to justify the
convictions for Burglary and Theft, requiring that Mr. Quintana's
convictions be reversed and the charges against him be dismissed.
Over the objection of counsel, the trial court gave an
instruction to the jury which was without a factual basis and which
relieved the State of its burden to prove each and every element of
the crimes charged against Mr. Quintana.

That instruction violated

Mr. Quintana's constitutional rights and he suffered prejudice
requiring that his convictions be reversed and a new trial ordered.

ARGUMENT

POINT I. THE PROSECUTOR'S MISCONDUCT IN THIS CASE
PREJUDICED MR. QUINTANA'S RIGHT TO A FUNDAMENTALLY
FAIR TRIAL AMD REQUIRES REVERSAL OF HIS
CONVICTIONS.
Prior to trial, Mr. Quintana filed a motion to suppress
the identification testimony of Mr. Calvin Dean Rains (R. 24-28; see

- 9

-

Addendum A ) . Mr. Rains had been informed by police officers that a
suspect in the burglary/theft case was in custody, and Mr. Rains had
been brought down to the station to see if he could make a positive
identification (R. 24-28, 34-35).

Police sat Mr. Rains at a desk

and then walked Mr. Quintana past him; no other suspects were walked
in front of Mr. Rains (R. 26-28, 33-35).

Mr. Quintana urged that

the subsequent identification of him by Mr. Rains was obtained in an
unconstitutional manner and moved the Court to suppress that
identification testimony (R. 24-28).

The trial court took the

motion under advisement (R. 39) and later issued an order granting
the motion to suppress the witness1 identification of Mr. Quintana
(R. 40; see Addendum B ) . The order stated:
On motion of the defendant and good cause
appearing it is hereby ordered that the motion to
suppress witness identification is granted.
The Court finds that the identification
procedure used in this case was suggestive and the
State is prohibited from using the testimony of
Mr. Dean Rains at any subsequent proceedings to
identify Mr. Andrew Quintana (R. 40).
During his opening statement, the prosecutor told the
jury that Mr. Rains informed the police that the burglar was this
defendant, Andrew Quintana, and that Mr. and Mrs. Rains watched the
defendant on the porch of the John home until he left the area and
parked down at the end of the street (R. 118 at 15-16).

The

prosecutor explained that Mr. Rains was curious to know what was
happening because something was "not right" (R. 118 at 16). He
stated that Mr. Rains got into his car and drove to the corner near
the alleyway which ran behind the John home (R. 118 at 16-17).
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The

prosecutor explained that Mr. Rains parked next to that alley
(R. 118 at 17). The prosecutor then stated:
that the defendant was out of sight.

"And [Mr. Rains] said

[Mr. Rains] didn't know

exactly where the defendant had gone but essentially he said he saw
him come out [of the alley from behind the John home]" (R. 118 at
17).

Counsel for Mr. Quintana immediately objected and asked to

approach the bench; a sidebar conference was then held (R. 118 at
17).
Returning to his opening statment, the prosecutor
continued:
By the way, Mr. Rains, as I mentioned, is
sitting here in his vehicle, and he sees this man
come out in the area here on the diagram, which is
almost adjacent to where Ted John lives. And he
said that when the man came out, he appeared to be
wearing some kind of a baggy shirt, something like
a large T-shirt. Appeared there was something up
underneath that T-shirt. He said that initially
when he saw the suspect, he kind of hesitated for
a minute, almost as if he was going to turn and go
the other way. Then he turned around and came
back down the alleyway.
He walked right in front of Mr. Rains and
went over and got into something inside that 1983
Mazda pickup and took off.
Well, Mr. Rains went back to his wife,
told her to call the police, and then he went over
to Ted John's house and discovered that the back
door was opened and went in and appeared someone
had been in there, inside the house. He waited
and the police eventually arrived (R. 118 at
17-18; see complete opening statement of
prosecutor at Addendum C ) .
After the prosecutor concluded his opening statement,
counsel for Mr. Quintana requested that the jury be excused so that
he could make a motion before he delivered his opening statement
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(R. 118 at 19). The Court obliged and defense counsel then moved
for a mistrial (R. 118 at 19-21).

Counsel urged that the prosecutor

had just accomplished for Mr. Rains what the Court had ordered could
not be done, to wit:

planted in the minds of the jurors that

Mr. Rains saw Mr. Quintana coming out of that alleyway (R. 118 at
19-20; see Addendum D for mistrial motion, argument and ruling).
The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial, stating:
THE COURT: Based on what has been argued,
the Court is going to deny the motion. Court will
either make a curative instruction, but I believe
the Court has already told the jurors that the
only evidence that they are to consider is the
evidence that's heard form the witness stand. So
as the evidence comes out in arguments that are
made you will have to—that will have to be tied
in, and I don't think it can be tied in as far as
the evidence is concerned.
So the motion will be denied (R. 118 at
21).
Mr. Quintana insists that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying the motion for mistrial, and he maintains that
the prosecutor's remarks constitute misconduct and in and of
themselves require that Mr. Quintana's convictions be reversed and
the case remanded for a new trial.
Case law espousing the duties and obligations of
prosecutors is legion.

Several such directives merit mentioning.

We have previously stated that the State
while charged with vigorously enforcing the laws
has a duty to not only secure appropriate
convictions, but an even higher duty to see that
justice is done. In his role as the State's
representative in criminal matters, the
prosecutor, therefore, must not only attempt to
win cases, but must see that justice is done.
Thus, while he should prosecute with earnestness
and vigor, it is as much his duty to refrain from
- 12 -

improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means
to bring about a just one.
Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 691 (Utah 1981) (quotations and
citations omitted).
The purpose of an opening statement is to
advise the jury of the facts relied upon and of
the questions and issues involved, which the jury
will have to determine, and to give them a general
picture of the facts and the situations, so that
they will be able to understand the evidence.
Counsel should outline generally what he intends
to prove, and should be allowed considerable
latitude. He should make a fair statement of the
evidence and the extent to which he may go is
largely in the discretion of the trial court. He
should not make a statement of any facts which he
cannot legally prove upon the trial; nor should he
argue the merits of his case, or relate the
testimony at length.
State v. Erwin, 120 P.2d 285, 313 (Utah 1941) (citations omitted;
emphasis added); accord United States v. Signer, 482 F.2d 394,
398-99 (6th Cir. 1973), and cases cited therein.
[A prosecutor] may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor—indeed he should do so.
But while he may strike hard blows, he is not at
liberty to strike foul ones. It is . . . his duty
to refrain from improper methods calculated to
produce a wrongful conviction.
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
In this case, the prosecutor violated the above tenets by
advancing in his opening statement the concept that his witness saw
Mr. Quintana in the alley behind the John residence emerging with a
bulge under his shirt—presumably of stolen goods.

The trial court

had ordered that Mr. Rains was prohibited from identifying
Mr. Quintana at any subsequent proceedings because the
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suggestiveness of the procedure used to obtain that identification
rendered it unreliable.

In advancing that the witness saw

Mr. Quintana, the prosecutor placed in the jurors' minds the
identification of Mr. Quintana by Mr. Rains in direct contravention
of the Court's order.

The prosecutor stated as fact something he

knew he could not legally establish at trial.
Because the statement violated the court order, the
prosecutor cannot claim the error was made either unintentionally or
somehow in good faith.

An examination of United States v. Johnson,

767 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1985), dispells this remote possibility.

In

Johnson, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals instructed'that
prosecutor misconduct "made during an opening statement makes it
more egregious than a similar remark would be during closing
argument."

Ld. at 1274.

The Court clarified that certain

improprieties during closing arguments can be excused as a product
of provocation but that an opening statement does not occur in such
a charged atmosphere and is usually presumed to be carefully
planned.

Id.
Nor can this Court permit the misconduct to stand because

the opening statements of counsel are not evidence—as urged by the
prosecutor and adapted by the trial court as basis to deny the
mistrial motion.

Rather, the Utah Supreme Court, in a case where

improper remarks of the prosecutor during opening statements were
found to be reversible error, State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah
1984), reiterated the standard governing reversals for improper
statements of the prosecutor.

The Court stated:
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The test of whether the remarks made by counsel
are so objectionable as to merit reversal in a
criminal case is, [1] did the remarks call to the
attention of the jurors matters which they would
not be justified in considering in determining
their verdict, and [2] were they, under the
circumstances of the particular case, probably
influenced by those remarks.
Id. at 486 (citing inter alia State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426
(Utah 1973).
Applying this test to Mr. Quintanafa case demonstrates
the prosecutor's misconduct merits reversal.

The first prong of the

test is met because the prosecutor's statement called to the
attention of the jurors a fact which had been suppressed by the
trial court and ordered inadmissible because of the violation of
Mr. Quintana's constitutional rights to due process and a fair
trial.

The prosecutor's statement disclosed to the jurors that,

contrary to the court order barring the information, Mr. Rains
identified Mr. Quintana as the man in the alley behind the John home
with a bulge under his shirt.

The jurors were not entitled to hear

that information.
The second prong—whether the jurors were influenced by
that information—is equally clear.

Because this case was conceded

by all to have been an identification case (R. 83-86; R. 118 at
19-21), the statement that Mr. Rains saw Mr. Quintana in the alley
behind the John residence with a bulge under his shirt provided the
jurors with an inference that the bulge might have been missing
property which might have come from the John home.

This information

"probably influenced the jurors" because no other information came
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as close to placing Mr, Quintana in the home, to establish the
burglary, or in possession of property belonging to the John family,
to establish the theft.
Inasmuch as the standard governing reversals for improper
statements of the prosecutor has been met, Mr. Quintana urges this
Court to find the remarks of the prosecutor in this case tD merit
reversal of his convictions for Burglary and Theft and for this
Court to remand his case for a new trial.

POINT II. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE CONVICTIONS OF
MR. QUINTANA.
Mr. Quintana maintains that the evidence adduced at trial
is unable to support the convictions of Burglary and Theft.

He

requests this Court to examine the sufficiency of the evidence,
reverse his convictions, and remand his case to the trial court with
an order dismissing the charges against him.

In State v. Petree,

659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court stated, "[N]ot
withstanding the presumptions in favor of the jury's decision, this
court still has the right to review the sufficiency of the evidence
to support the verdict."

Further, the Court noted:

We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient
evidence only when the evidence is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime for
which he was convicted.
Id.

This standard restates the due process requirement which

prohibits a criminal conviction in any case except upon proof beyond
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